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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(a)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Utah law requires Mr. Burgandy to pay back General Assistance benefits which he
received during the pendency of an unsuccessful appeal of his ineligibility determination.
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-l-502(l)(b)(i), -502(2) (1997). Does the statute violate the open
courts provision of the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 11, by unreasonably burdening his
access to court for review of his ineligibility determination?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This issue sets forth a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. No
special deference is given to the trial court's ruling on appeal. Bingham v. Bingham. 872
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the determination of this case: Utah Code
Ann. § 35A-1-502 (1997) and the Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. The full text of
these provisions is found in Addendum A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Department of Human Services, Office of Family Support, notified Appellant
Burgandy that his General Assistance benefits would be terminated due to his
ineligibility. He challenged this finding in a Fair Hearing. Burgandy elected to receive
General Assistance benefits pending the hearing determination. He lost that hearing, thus
incurring an overpayment of General Assistance benefits. Burgandy contends that Utah
Code Ann. § 35A-1-502, which requires repayment of benefits for which one is ineligible,
is unconstitutional as applied to him. He argues that the possibility of repayment of
benefits received pending the fair hearing determination burdens his right of access to the
courts and violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.

2

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The Second District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Judgment and Order on July 13, 1997, affirming that Burgandy had incurred an
overpayment of $726.00, and concluding that requiring him to pay it back did not chill or
burden his right to access the court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
T. Tron Burgandy began receiving General Assistance (GA) benefits in May 1994.
(R. at 137) While receiving those benefits, he applied to the Social Security
Administration for Social Security and Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. (R.
at 137) The Ogden Office of Family Support notified Burgandy on July 21, 1994, that his
case would be closed effective July 31, 1994. (R. at 137) He was determined ineligible
for GA because the Form 21- G Medical Report that he provided to his caseworker
indicated he could perform work with slight to moderate limitations. (R. at 60)
Burgandy requested a fair hearing to challenge the finding of ineligibility and case
closure. (R. at 43) Additionally, he requested that his General Assistance be continued
pending the outcome of the hearing. (R. at 39) The HEARING RIGHTS/REQUEST
FOR HEARING form notifies Burgandy:
If the hearing decision supports the agency action and you are
not successful in any further appeal of that decision, you may
have an overpayment if you receive continued or reinstated
benefits. You will have to pay back any overpayment.

3

(R. at 43) A fair hearing was held on August 16. 1994 sustaining the closure of his
case. (R. at 39) Burgandv subsequently requested agency review of that hearing. (R. at
40)
Because he was found ineligible for benefits, the Office of Recovery Services
(ORS) initiated a recovery action for overpaid benefits by serving Burgandy with a
Notice of Agency Action: Overpayment Determination. The Notice alleged that
Burgandy incurred an overpayment for benefits received during the time his fair hearing
was pending. (R. at 40) This administrative action was stayed pending the final result of
Burgandy's fair hearing appeal.
While the fair hearing determination was pending, the Social Security
Administration notified Burgandy that he was found retroactively eligible for Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits commencing September 1993. (R. at 40)
The Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings affirmed the fair hearing decision,
noting that Burgandy was not eligible for assistance under the provisions of the General
Assistance Program, and that retroactive eligibility for SSDI was not determinative of
General Assistance eligibility. (R. at 61)
Burgandy did not pursue the eligibility determination further. He did challenge
repayment of the overpayment in an administrative hearing held March 10, 1997. (R. at
41) The Hearing Officer found Burgandy liable for repayment of the overpaid benefits.
(R. at 70)
4

Burgandy. having exhausted required administrative remedies, filed a complaint
for judicial review in the Second District Court alleging that repayment of benefits he
received while awaiting the outcome of his original fair hearing decision violated article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. (R. at 4) Burgandy appeals from the adverse
judgment against him. (Addendum B) He challenges the constitutionality of the statute
requiring him to repay benefits for which he was ineligible, but does not challenge the
determination of ineligibility.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502 does not violate article I, section 11 of the Utah
Constitution. This section requires that any overpayment of public assistance be repaid to
the State. Although a recipient has the right to a hearing before General Assistance
benefits are terminated, there is no right to benefits for which the individual was not
eligible. Administrative and judicial avenues of review afford the individual an
opportunity to challenge agency actions and seek redress of injury. The fact that a
recipient may have to repay benefits received pending an unsuccessful eligibility
challenge is not an unreasonable burden on that individual's right to access the courts.
An overpayment of assistance paid pending the fair hearing decision is not incurred
because an individual exercises a hearing right. It occurs because the person received
public assistance for which he or she was ineligible and as such should be repaid to the
State.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 35A-1-502 AND AGENCY POLICY REQUIRE
REPAYMENT OF ALL OVERPAYMENTS OF PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE, REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE.
A.

The General Assistance Program.

The General Assistance Program (GA) is established by Utah Code Annotated §§
35A-3-401 to -402 (1997). It is provided to individuals who
[a]re not receiving cash assistance under Part 3, Family
Employment Program, or Supplemental Security Income, and
who are unemployable according to standards promulgated by
the department.
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-401(l)(a) (1997). The program provides temporary cash
assistance to qualified individuals while they are working to become employed or to
qualify for Social Security benefits. Utah Admin. Code R986-218-801(1) (1998).
(Addendum A) It is a program that provides "financial assistance on a short term basis
while participants are involved in medical and/or mental health treatment to overcome the
limitations keeping them from employment." Id* Unlike other assistance programs that
receive federal support, the GA program is funded solely with State monies.
If the Office of Family Support1 determines that a recipient has become ineligible

lr

rhe program, during the time Burgandy was found ineligible for assistance and
incurred the overpayment in question, was administered by the Department of Human
Services, Office of Family Support (OFS). After Welfare Reform, the Department of
Workforce Services was established and responsibility for public assistance programs was
transferred to it.
6

for General Assistance, it notifies the individual that his or her case will be closed and
benefits terminated. Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 110. (Addendum C) However,
under Goldberg v. Kellv. 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), a recipient
is entitled to a hearing before the case is closed. Accordingly, the recipient is notified that
he or she may request a fair hearing to contest the closure of the case. Utah-DHS-OFS
Volume II Section 190. (Addendum C) When requesting a fair hearing, the recipient
may elect to continue receiving benefits pending the decision or to have those benefits
stopped.2 Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 190-2. (Addendum C) If the Hearing
Officer determines that the recipient's case was properly closed and that the eligibility
criteria were not met, the recipient may have incurred an overpayment and must repay
any benefits to which he or she was not entitled. Benefits received while the fair hearing
is pending are generally referred to by agency workers as continued or reinstated benefits.
B.

Overpayments.

Section 35A-1-502 addresses civil liability for overpayments of public assistance.
This section defines an overpayment as
money, public assistance, or any other thing of value provided under a state
or federally funded benefit program to the extent that the person receiving
2

Section 190-2 (1) applies to a continuation of benefits pending the eligibility
challenge. Section 190-2 (4)(A) discusses stopping the assistance at the recipient's
request. The policy instructs workers to stop assistance if the recipient so requests in
writing. The HEARING RIGHTS/REQUEST FOR HEARING form (R. at 43) allows the
individual to check off whether they wish benefits to continue or stop. This is considered
written notice.
7

the thing of value is not entitled to receive it or is not entitled to receive it at
the level provided.
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502 (l)(b)(i) (1997).3 (Addendum A) The statute further
requires that
[e]ach provider, client, or other person who receives an
overpayment shall, regardless of fault, return the overpayment
3r repay its value to the department immediately:
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment
from the department; or
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if that occurs
prior to receiving notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502(2) (1997). The statute also identifies conditions under
which interest or civil penalties for fraudulent conduct by the recipient may be assessed.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 35A-l-502(3) - (7) (1997).
Agency policy instructs workers and recipients on operation of the various
assistance programs. The policy governing the General Assistance program when
Burgandy incurred this overpayment was found in Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II. Burgandy
argues that Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 840-1 limits recovery to three specific
categories of overpayments, and that benefits received pending a fair hearing are a
3

In his brief, Burgandy cites to section 35A-1-502. However, in 1994, when this
action began the provisions were found at section 62A-9-129. They were renumbered in
1997 when the Department of Workforce Services assumed responsibility for
administering public assistance programs. The use of the 1998 language has no bearing
on the question of whether collection of the benefits in question burdens the right to
access the courts. A copy of the 1994 statute is included in Addendum A.
8

separate category which agency policy never contemplated. Appellant's Brief at 7. This
is an incorrect reading of policy. Section 840-1. which Burgandy relies on, addresses
causes rather than categories of overpayment. Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 840-1.
(Addendum C) The three causes of overpayments listed are: inadvertent error,
administrative error, and intentional violation. This is not an inclusive list of distinct
overpayment classifications that the agency may collect.4 Likewise, an overpayment for
benefits received while the fair hearing is pending is not a separate class of overpayment.
The term "continued benefits" is merely terminology used by OFS and its workers as
reference to the time period in which the benefits were issued. It is not a designation of
overpayment type.5
Neither the statute nor agency policy implemented to carry it out restrict the

4

This section of policy instructs the OFS worker to refer all overpayments to the
Office of Recovery Services (ORS). The OFS worker identifies the cause when referring
the overpayment to Recovery Services so that ORS handles it appropriately. For
example, if the overpayment is caused by fraudulent conduct, the statute provides for civil
penalties and program disqualifications. Penalties are not sought if the case is referred for
an overpayment based on the recipient's mistake or an agency error.
5

When referring the overpayment to ORS, the OFS worker codes an overpayment
for benefits received pending a fair hearing as inadvertent error. Barring evidence to the
contrary, the worker assumes that the hearing was requested because the recipient
mistakenly believed he or she was eligible for benefits. It is then treated as such under
ORS policy. Burgandy himself acknowledges that the legislature can properly require the
repayment of overpayments caused by fraud, mistake, or administrative error.
Appellant's Brief at 11. Regardless of cause, recipients are responsible for the repayment
of any overpayment of assistance. Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 A-1-502 (2) (1997). (Addendum
A)
9

definition of overpayments to a finite number of categories that may be recovered. The
term overpayment is statutorily defined and the agency is not granted authority to limit
that definition in policy. The plain language of the statute contemplates recovery of "any
thing of value" which the recipient was not eligible to receive. Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1502(1 )(b)(i) (1998). Burgandy concedes that the definition is broad enough to include
benefits paid to him pending his fair hearing. Appellant's Brief at 8.
II

SECTION 35A-1-502 AND THE STATUTORY SCHEME FOR
COLLECTION OF OVERPAYMENTS PROVIDE REASONABLE
ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I,
SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a
party.

Utah Const, art. I, section 11. This provision is also referred to as the "open courts"
provision. Its purpose is to assure access to the courts and an equitable judicial
procedure. Berrv ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). The Utah
Supreme Court has determined that article I, section 11 "establishes that the framers of
the Constitution intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of effective
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." I d at 675. Further, the Utah

10

Supreme Court has noted that the right to access the judicial system to seek remedy for
injuries was not meant to be an "empty gesture/* Id While the legislature has power to
modernize by eliminating or creating laws and rights
[t]he basic purpose of Article I, section IK however, is to
impose some limitation on that power since those persons
who are injured in their persons, property, or reputations are
generally isolated in society, belong to no identifiable group,
and rarely are able to rally the political process to their aid.
Id. at 676. Thus, article 1, section 11 ensures that Utah citizens have a means of redress
for injury.
It is unclear which right Burgandy alleges the statute burdens: the right to an
administrative fair hearing on eligibility only; the right to judicial access in reviewing that
decision; or the combined administrative and judicial review process as a whole. To the
extent he argues that the impaired right is that to an administrative hearing, Utah courts
have not addressed whether a state constitutional guarantee of access to the courts applies
to a challenge of burdening access to the administrative process. To the extent he argues
that the impaired right is the right of access to the courts, or to the judicial and
administrative process as a whole, reasonable access to both exists.
A.

Possible repayment by an ineligible recipient of benefits paid
pending a fair hearing does not unreasonably deny access to judicial
review.

Section 35A-1-502 provides a means for citizens to challenge actions which result
from its enforcement. The statute itself defines an overpayment, requires it to be repaid,
11

and addresses the conditions in which civil penalties are incurred. Standing alone, it
neither advances nor restricts remedies available to the recipient who feels that he has
incurred an overpayment in error. However, statutory and administrative procedures are
in place that allow challenge of eligibility for public assistance benefits and recovery of
overpayments.
Burgandy is provided an opportunity to challenge his eligibility determination in
an administrative setting, with access to judicial review of that decision. Any recipient
who disagrees with an agency determination of ineligibility may request a fair hearing to
contest it. Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 190. If unsuccessful, the recipient may
seek review by the Office of Administrative Hearings or in the district courts. UtahDHS-OFS Volume II Section 190-9 (2).
Similarly, Burgandy is provided with an effective and reasonable remedy for
challenging the establishment and collection of overpayments. The Office of Recovery
Services establishes overpayments through an adjudicative proceeding as set forth in the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1997). Utah
Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-202, -203 (1997). An informal hearing is conducted and a
decision is issued by the Presiding Officer. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i) (1997). A
recipient has a right to request reconsideration of that decision on an administrative level
or pursue judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13, -15 (1997).
Section 35A-1-502 combined with policy and additional statutory provisions
12

provides recipients access to remedy throught both administrative and judicial processes.
1.

The Berry analysis is inapplicable because the statute
does not abrogate the individual's right to access the
judicial system and seek redress of an injury.

Repayment of continued benefits is not an unreasonable bar to judicial review.
Although Burgandy devotes much time to arguing that continued benefits should be
analyzed under a heightened standard of review using the two-part test set out by the Utah
Supreme Court in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, the Berry test is not applicable to
an analysis of section 35A-1-502. The proper inquiry is whether the potential repayment
of benefits received pending an unsuccessful eligibility challenge unreasonably bars
judicial access. See Jensen v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992).
The test set forth in Berry, and subsequent cases, is applied when a statute seeks,
on its face, to limit or abrogate a remedy in the courts. In Berry, the plaintiff brought a
wrongful death suit on behalf of herself and her children for the death of her husband who
died in a plane crash. Berry. 717 P.2d at 671. The Utah Product Liability Statute of
Repose eliminated all causes of action connected with the initial purchase and
manufacture of a product after a specific time period, thereafter barring the action. The
Utah Supreme Court used a two-part analysis to determine whether this abrogation of
access to the courts was constitutional:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by the
course of law" for vindication of his constitutional interest.
13

The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in
providing essentially comparable substantive protection to
one's person, property, or reputation, although the form of the
substitute remedy may be different.
Id. at 680.
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.
Id. Hence, Berry is utilized when a statute limits or abrogates the right to seek a judicial
remedy. In such a circumstance, the court must determine if a reasonable alternative to
bringing legal action exists, or if the abrogation of such a remedy is a reasonable means
of eliminating a social or economic evil.6 This is not the case in Burgandy's situation.
Unlike the statute reviewed in Berry, section 35A-1-502 does not eliminate access
to the court for contesting an eligibility determination or an overpayment. As shown,

6

The analysis applied in Berry has been used in subsequent Utah cases where a
statutory provision facially limited the plaintiffs access to the courts or to recover fully.
See generally Ross v. ShackeL 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996) (holding that Governmental
Immunity Act as applied to a prison doctor did not violate open courts provision because
there was no abrogation of a common law right); Horton v. Goldminers Daughter. 785
P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) (holding that a Utah architects and builders Statute of Repose
violated the open courts provision); Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348,
(Utah 1989), (holding that a recovery limits statute, as applied to University Hospital,
violated Article I, section 11); Currier v. Holden.862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993)
(holding that a 90-day statute of limitations was an unreasonable limitation on a
prisoner's right to petition for habeas corpus).
14

both the processes for challenging program eligibility and the overpayment recovery
process itself provide access to administrative and judicial avenues of review, which
Burgandy has used and continues to use in this very appeal. As access to these processes
is neither limited nor abrogated, the Berry test is inapplicable.
Burgandy's argument, although confusing, is not that the right to access the courts
is abrogated. Instead, he argues that the possibility of repaying benefits received pending
the outcome of the hearing has such a chilling effect on his right to access the system that,
as a practical matter, it is a bar to that access. This argument is more closely aligned to
that raised in Jensen v. Tax Comm'n and its ensuing cases.
2.

The proper inquiry is whether or not an unreasonable
denial of access to judicial review exists.

Jensen v. Tax Commission, and several cases which followed it, dealt with the
question of whether or not certain requirements or pre-conditions, such as pre-payment of
a fee, constituted a sufficient deterrent to accessing the court as to violate article I, section
11. In Jensen, the plaintiffs, like Burgandy, had administrative and judicial review
processes available to them for redress of their claim. They asserted, however, that the
requirement that a taxpayer seeking judicial review must deposit the full amount of the
challenged taxes, interest, and penalties with the Tax Commission was in effect a bar to
accessing the available judicial review.
The Utah Supreme Court found that the statutory requirement, as applied to the

15

plaintiffs, precluded reasonable access to the couns. thereby violating article I, section 11
of the Utah Constitution. Jensen. 835 P.2d at 969. The court noted, however, that the
statutory requirements are not unconstitutional in all cases. If a taxpayer were able to
meet the deposit requirements, the deposit should be made. Id.
The court revisited the issue in Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Commission. 904 P.2d
662 (Utah 1995). Like the taxpayers in Jensen, the Maryboys alleged that prepayment of
the tax, interest and penalties barred their right to judicial review. In this instance,
however, it had been determined that the taxpayers had sufficient assets to prepay the tax
and penalties. While doing so might inconvenience them, it did not deny them reasonable
access to the court, id.
Likewise, this Court adopted the same reasoning in Hansen v. Wilkinson. 889 P.2d
927 (Utah App. 1995). Hansen, a prisoner, argued that payment of a filing fee was
indistinguishable from the burden placed on the petitioner in Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d
1357 (Utah App. 1993) where this Court held that a 90-day statute of limitations was an
unreasonable limitation on the right to petition for habeas corpus. The Court found the
argument to be without merit because the statute requiring a prisoner to pay a filing fee
did not unreasonably limit his right to petition for extraordinary relief. Id.
Admittedly, Burgandy's situation differs from that of these other plaintiffs. These
cases deal with accessing the court, not the administrative system, and with a precondition rather than a possible repayment. However, Burgandy, like the plaintiffs in
16

Jensen, Maryboy. and Hansen, has an avenue for redress available but contends that his
ability to access the system is somehow burdened.
The correct question to be decided by the Court under this Jensen type scenario, is
whether the possibility of repayment of continued benefits unreasonably burdens access
to judicial review. Under a Jensen analysis, it does not.
3.

There is no unreasonable denial of access to the courts.

The possibility that Burgandy may be determined ineligible for a program and may
have to repay benefits received pending that determination in no way bars his access to
the court. Possible repayment of a benefit to which one is not entitled is distinguishable
from prepayment of a challenged tax and fine. Burgandy was not required to meet a precondition before requesting his hearing. He paid neither fee, nor the overpayment amount
in order to request a fair hearing.
Burgandy analogizes his situation to that in Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th
Cir. 1976) in which an urban renewal authority relocation officer threatened to withhold
$10,000.00 properly owing the plaintiffs should they file a lawsuit on a separate action.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
A public official's threats to a citizen to withhold monies due
and owing, should legal proceedings on an independent
matter be instituted, burdens or chills constitutional rights of
access to the courts. And this is true although the threat is not
actually effective.
Silver. 529 F.2d at 163. The analogy is incorrect. The State agrees that a threat to hold
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back money which is legally due and owing would be a bar to accessing the courts.
However, the State is not threatening to withhold benefits legally due and owing
Burgandy in order to discourage his challenge of eligibility. It is only attempting to
collect back benefits for which he was ineligible under the program requirements.
Burgandy asserts that the only reason this overpayment is incurred is because his
right to a hearing is exercised. Appellant's Brief at 11. This argument is also without
merit. The overpayment is incurred because he is not eligible for the benefits he received,
not because he requested a hearing. If, at hearing, Burgandy had been found eligible for
the benefits, no overpayment would have been incurred. Further, a recipient like
Burgandy, who was on notice that the agency considers him ineligible for the assistance
program, may discontinue benefits pending the hearing so that no overpayment for that
time period occurs should he not prevail.
As previously discussed, individuals determined ineligible for public assistance are
entitled to a hearing before those benefits cease. Goldberg. 397 U.S. at 267. The fair
hearing with continuation of benefits pending the decision protects the due process right
established in Goldberg and allows an individual to have a means of support in case there
has been a misapplication of policy in determining ineligibility. However, Goldberg
guarantees Burgandy due process before his benefits are terminated. It does not establish
a substantive right to benefits for which he was never eligible.
Burgandy5s theory, followed to its logical conclusion, would require the state to
18

provide benefits to a recipient regardless of eligibility. There is no support for this in
Utah constitutional provisions, statutes, or case law. It is illogical that a recipient would
be entitled to benefits issued solely because he requested a hearing when he did not meet
the underlying eligibility requirements for them.
Burgandy contends that the "threat of repayment," although not a retaliatory action
by the state, has the same effect — it will chill a citizen from exercising his right to access
the court. Appellant's Brief at 24. Although Burgandy continually refers to the
repayment of these benefits as a threat, that is not so. There is no threat. The probability
of paying back something to which you were never entitled if you are the losing party is
inherent in many civil actions. It is not considered a bar to accessing administrative or
judicial remedies.
III.

THE ELIGIBILITY RULES AND POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DO NOT APPLY TO THE
STATE FUNDED GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.
Burgandy expends considerable time and effort exhorting the court to consider

how the Social Security program is run and urging that the General Assistance program
be run in the same way. He suggests that the GA Program adopt Social Security's policy
of waiving repayment of benefits accrued pending a hearing if the recipient challenged
the agency's action in good faith. However, the alternatives offered represent decisions
to be made in the legislative and policy-making arenas.
The fact that Burgandy was ultimately eligible for benefits under the Social
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Security program and that the federal agency applies a different policy for recovery of
benefits paid pending the outcome of a hearing is not relevant to the issue on appeal here.
The policy alternative Burgandy offers does not go to the question of constitutionality and
access to the court and is, therefore, not an issue properly before the court.
Different programs have different rules. Regardless of what federal law or policy
allows, there is no corresponding state statute or policy excusing recovery of
overpayments when the recipient appeals an ineligibility determination in good faith.
Utah law requires recovery of all overpayments regardless of fault. Utah Code Ann. §
35A-1-502(2)(1997).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Department of Human Services urges this Court to
affirm the decision of the trial court which held that Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502 does
not violate article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, and, therefore, the administrative
decision awarding the State of Utah an overpayment in the amount of $726 is correct.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS o ) 1 DAY OF JANUARY, 1999

Ann
Assistant Attorney General
Karma K. Dixon
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
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Addendum A

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.\
319.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.<•
Rev. 177.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et*

Art. I, § 11

sion of operator's license for ''habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R.4th 565.
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th
1141.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from,
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th
1119.
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 9 et seq.

seq.

C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq.
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-"
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal1
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321.
Issues in garnishment as triable to court orr
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393.
Automobiles: validity and construction oflf
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALVSIS

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration Act.
Assignments.
Attorneys' duties.
Criminal law.
—Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Injury or damage to property.
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
—Limitations of actions.
—Statutory limitation of review.
Occupational disease law.
Sovereign immunity.
Torts.
—Action by wife against husband.
—Lass of consortium.
Unlicensed law practice.
Waiver of rights.
Workmen's compensation law.
Cited.

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts,
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d
625 (Utah 1977).
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper
case, but such dismissal should be without
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his
suit to another forum without harm to his
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah
1977).
Actions by court
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. &
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 AJLJL
1119 (1919).
Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the
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35A-1-502

UTAH WORKFORCE SERVICES CODE

"Chapter 8, Employment Support Act" was
changed to "Chapter 3, Employment Support
Act" pursuant to Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 329.

35A-1-502. Civil liability for overpayment.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly" mean the same as those
terms are defined in Section 76-2-103.
(b) (i) "Overpayment" means money, public assistance, or any other
thing of value provided under a state or federally funded benefit
program to the extent that the person receiving the thing of value is
not entitled to receive it or is not entitled to receive it at the levelprovided.
(ii) "Overpayment" includes money paid to a provider under this
title in connection with public assistance; Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part
3, Public Support of Children; Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act; Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on
Paternity; or any other publicly funded assistance benefit program to
the extent that the provider receives payment:
(A) for goods or services not provided; or
(B) in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled.
(c) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section
62A-1M03.
(2) Each provider, client, or other person who receives an overpayment
shall, regardless of fault, return the overpayment or repay its value to the
department immediately:
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment from the department; or
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if t h a t occurs prior to receiving
notice.
(3) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (3)(b), interest on the
unreturned balance of the overpayment shall accrue at the rate of 10% a
year until an administrative or judicial judgment is entered.
(b) If the overpayment was not the fault of the person receiving it, that
person is not liable for interest on the unreturned balance.
(c) In accordance with rules adopted by the department, an overpayment may be recovered through deductions from cash assistance, general
assistance, food stamps, or other cash-related assistance provided to a
client under Chapter 3, Employment Support Act.
(4) Each person who knowingly assists a client, provider, or other person in
obtaining an overpayment is jointly and severally liable for the overpayment.
(5) (a) In proving liability for overpayment under this section or Subsection
62A-ll-204.1(2)(a)(i) when fault is alleged, the department shall prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the overpayment was obtained intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, by false statement, misrepresentation,
impersonation, or other fraudulent means, such as by committing any of
the acts or omissions described in Sections 76-8-1203 through 76-8-1205.
(b) If fault is established under Subsection (5)(a), any person who
obtained or helped another obtain an overpayment shall be subject to:
(i) a civil penalty of 10% of the amount of the overpayment; and
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(n) disqualification from receiving public assistance for 12 months
for the first offense, 24 months for the second offense, and permanently for the third offense or as otherwise provided by federal law.
(6) (a) If an action is filed, the department may recover, in addition to the
principal sum plus interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs unless the
repayment obligation arose from an administrative error by the division.
(b) Upon receipt, the department shall forward attorneys' fees recovered under Subsection (6)(a) to the attorney general's office or the county
attorney's office that litigated the matter.
(7) If a court finds that funds or benefits were secured, in whole or part, by
fraud by the person from whom repayment is sought, the court shall assess an
additional sum as considered appropriate as punitive damages up to the
amount of repayment being sought
History: C. 1953, 62A-9-129, e n a c t e d by L.
1994, ch. 122, ^ 2; r e n u m b e r e d by L. 1997,
ch. 174, § 7.
Repeals and R e e n a c t m e n t s . — Laws
1994 ch 122, § 2 repeals former § 62A-9-129
as enacted by Laws 1988, ch 1, § 246 requir
ing repayment of benefits improperly received
and enacts the present section effective March
16 1994
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1997 amend
ment effective July 1 1997 renumbered this
section which former y appeared as § 62A-9
129 deleted medical or other benefit food
stamps after assistance and entitlement
after
„*«. "funded"
«r™i~i» in
,., Subsection
C . , K ™ . ™ (l)(b)(i)
M V U . „substi
„U-,
tuted "this title in connection with public assis-

tance" for "this chapter" and "assistance" for
"entitlement," inserted "Title 62A " and deleted
"of this Title" after "Children" in Subsection
(l)(b)(ii) substituted "client" for "recipient" in
Subsections (2) and (4), added Subsections
(3)(c), (5)(b), (5)(b)(n) (6) and (7) deleted "shall
be imposed on each person who obtained or
helped another obtain an overpayment by any
of these means" after overpayment" in Subsect l o n (5)(D)(i), and made stylistic changes
Compiler's N o t e s . - The reference to
"Chapter 8, Employment Support Act" in Subs e c t i o n (3)(c) was changed to "Chapter 3, Em„i__ +c
~_+ \„+»
„
f^T„,»oiQQ7
ployment
Act pursuant to Laws 1997,
ch
375, § Support
329

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Estoppel.
Former section did not clearly operate as an
anti-estoppel provision, and a recipient could
raise an equitable estoppel defense against
efforts by the Department of Human Services

to recover the value of a food stamp
ovenssuance from him Mendez v Utah Dept
of Social Servs 813 P2d 1234 (Utah Ct App
1991)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am J u r 2d Welfare Laws
§§ 24 5 91, 93 to 104

C.J.S. — 81 C J S Social Security and Public
Welfare §§ 17, 122, 138

35A-1-503. Evidence in legal actions.
In any civil action pursuant to this part.
(1) A fund transfer or payment instrument made to the order of a party
shall constitute prima facie evidence that such party received cash
assistance under Chapter 3, Employment Support Act, from the state.
(2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this part, all of the records
in the custody of the department relating to the application for, verification of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall constitute
business records within the meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
of evidence.
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62A-9-126. Enforcement of provisions — County attorney
or district attorney — Attorney general.
At the request of the office, it is the duty of the county attorney or district
attorney, as appropriate under Sections 17-18-1, 17-18-1.5, and 17-18-1.7, and
the attorney general to represent the office in any legal action taken under this
chapter or under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 12, Public Assistance Fraud.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-126, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 243; 1993, ch. 38, § 66; 1994,
ch. 122, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

62A-9-127, 62A-9-128.

ment, effective March 16, 1994, rewrote the,
section to such an extent that a detailed anal-,
ysis is impracticable.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, § 15 repeals
§§ 62A-9-127 and 62A-9-128, as last amended
by Laws 1988, ch. 242, § 26 and as enacted by
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 245, imposing a duty to

report additional income and prohibiting specified fraudulent activities, effective March 16f>
1994. For criminal provisions on public assistance fraud, see § 76-8-1201 et seq.

62A-9-129. Civil liability for overpayment.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly" mean the same as those
terms are defined in Section 76-2-103.
(b) (i) "Overpayment" means money, public assistance, medical or other
benefit, food stamp, or any other thing of value provided under a state
or federally funded entitlement benefit program to the extent that the
person receiving the thing of value is not entitled to receive it, or is not
entitled to receive it at the level provided.
(ii) "Overpayment" includes money paid to a provider under this
chapter; Chapter 11, Part 3, Public Support of Children, of this title;
Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act; Title 78,
Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity; or any other publicly funded
-entitlement benefit program to the extent that the provider receives
payment for goods or services not provided or payment in excess of the
amount to which the provider is entitled.
'1
(c) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section
?
62A-11-103.
1
(2) Each provider, recipient, or other person who receives an overpayment
shall, regardless of fault, return the overpayment or repay its value to the.
department immediately:
r '$
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment from the department; or
^
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if that occurs prior to receiving
notice.
*!f
(3) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (b), interest on the unreturned
balance of the overpayment accrues at the rate of 10% a year until an
administrative or judicial judgment is entered.
ftjj
(b) If the overpayment was not the fault of the person receiving it, tha^
person is not liable for interest on the unreturned balance.
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(4) Each person who knowingly assists a recipient, provider, or other person
in obtaining an overpayment is jointly and severally liable for the overpayment.
(5) In proving liability for overpayment under this section or Subsection
62A-ll-204.1(2)(a)(i) when fault is alleged, the department shall prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the overpayment was obtained intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, by false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation,
or other fraudulent means, such as by committing any of the acts or omissions
described in Sections 76-8-1203 through 76-8-1205. A civil penalty of 10% of
the amount of the overpayment shall be imposed on each person who obtained
or helped another obtain an overpayment by any of these means.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-129, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1994, ch. 122, § 2 repeals former § 62A-9-129,

62A-9-130.

as enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 246, requiring repayment of benefits improperly received,
and enacts the present section, effective March
16, 1994.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, § 15 repeals
§ 62A-9-130, as last amended by Laws 1990,
ch. 175, § 1, prohibiting vanous fraudulent

activities, effective March 16, 1994. For criminal provisions on public assistance fraud, see
§ 76-8-1201 et seq.

62A-9-131. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits.
In any civil action pursuant to this chapter:
(1) A paid state warrant made to the order of a party shall constitute
prima facie evidence that such party received financial assistance from the
state.
(2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, all of the
records in the custody of the department relating to the application for,
verification of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall
constitute business records within the meaning of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule of evidence.
(3) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the value of
the benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or usual charge for
similar benefits in the private sector.
. History: C. 1953,62A-9-131, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 248; 1994, ch. 122, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective March 16, 1994, deleted "or

criminal" after "any civil" in the first sentence,
deleted former Subsection (4), providing that
repayment is not a defense in a criminal action,
and made stylistic changes.

62A-9-134. County attorney and attorney general responsibilities.
It is the duty of each county attorney, as appropriate under Sections 17-18-1,
17-18-1.5, and 17-18-1.7, and the attorney general to carry out the mandates
set forth in this chapter.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-134, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, § 251; 1993, ch. 38, § 67; 1994,
ch. 122, § 4.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective March 16, 1994, deleted "district attorney" after "county attorney."
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EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT

R986-218. Financial A s s i s t a n c e
tance/Self-Sufficiency Program.

General

Assis-

R986-218-800. Incorporation by Reference.
R986-218-801. Authority.
R986-218-802. Description.
R986-218-810. Program Standards.
R986-218-820. Income Standards, Eligibility and Grant
Determination.
R986-218-830. Assets.
R986-218-840. GA Medical Benefit.
R986-218-850. Reviews.
R986-218-860. Special General Assistance Program For
Transient Persons.
R986-218-800. Incorporation by R e f e r e n c e .
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to 45 CFR
refer to the Code of Federal Regulations, 45, P a r t s 200
through 499, revised as of October 1, 1990. All referenced
Federal Regulation are available for public review at the
Division of Employment Development, 140 E a s t 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103.
R986-218-801. Authority.
The department requires compliance with U.C. 62A-9114.
R986-218-802. Description.
1. The General Assistance Self-Sufficiency Program
(GASSP) provides temporary cash assistance to single
persons and couples while they are overcoming t h e condition making them unemployable or while they are qualifying for SSI. The GASSP Program provides financial assistance on a short term basis while participants are involved
in medical and/or mental health treatment to overcome the
limitations keeping them from employment.
2. The program is based on the concept of mutual
responsibility. The client h a s the responsibility to make
efforts to overcome the condition making h i m unemployable and to move towards self-sufficiency or to qualify for
other benefits.
3. Less capable clients will receive special help from
department staff in applying for these other benefits and
participating in Self-Sufficiency activities.
4. Department staff have the responsibility to assist
clients in becoming self-sufficient and in securing other
benefits.
5. To qualify, individuals must:
a. Be a t least 18 years old or emancipated.
b. Be unemployable because of a medical or psychological
problem or they must be unable to work a t a job at least 23
hours weekly at minimum wage (gainful employment of
$500 per month).
c. Participate in rehabilitation and employment services
and follow through on efforts to qualify for other benefits
for which they may be eligible. This includes SSI, Social
Security Disability, Veterans Benefits, Workers' Compensation.
6. A person eligible for Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
assistance is not eligible for GASSP
7. AFDC rules R986-211 through R986-215 apply unless
a different rule is stated below.
R986-218-810. Program Standards.
1. The following definitions apply to this section:
a. "Bona fide offer of employment" m e a n s an offer of
employment was given and was.made in good faith.
b. "Good cause for refusing employment" m e a n s a definite job offer was not made; the wages did not meet
minimum wage requirements; the employment was a risk
to the health or safety of the worker; t h e employment
lacked workmen's compensation benefits; the position offered is vacant due to a strike, lockout or other bona fide

R986-218-810 (10/97)

labor dispute; or the individual is unable to work for
physical reasons or for lack of transportation.
2. Age and Factually Emancipated Child:
a. The individual m u s t be a t least eighteen years of age
or emancipated.
b. A person who is not legally emancipated may claim to
be factually emancipated. He m u s t live independently from
his parents or guardian and have been economically selfsupporting for the past six months.
c. If the parents are available the local department office
shall contact them.
i. The child is ineligible if the parents will support him.
ii. If the parents refuse to support the child or are
unavailable, child support enforcement procedures must
be followed.
iii. If the applicant refuses without good cause to cooperate in locating the parents, h e is ineligible.
3. Determination of Employability:
A person must work less t h a n 100 hours per month and
must meet one of the following three criteria:
i. Unemployable, or
or
ii. 60 years of age or older.
4. Unemployable:
a. The applicant must provide medical evidence t h a t he
is not employable due to a physical or mental impairment.
The impairment must be so severe that the person cannot
do his previous work. In addition, he could not reasonably
hope to find any other kind of "substantial work" considering his age, education, and work experience. "Substantial
work" is work paying $500 or more a month.
b. The local department office may accept a physician's
statement, a licensed/certified psychologist statement, a
Utah Medical Assistance Program statement, or a statement from another agency involved in disability determination, such as, the Veterans Administration or the Division of Rehabilitation Services. The local department office
may require a second opinion by a specific person or
agency. The cost of a physical examination will be paid by
the local department office.
i. If the medical report says the client can work with no
limitations or t h a t the limitations will last less than 30
days from the date of the onset of the physical or mental
impairment, the case will be denied.
ii. If the medical report indicates the applicant is unable
to work for 30 days or more from the date of the onset of
physical or mental impairment, he is considered unemployable.
iii. If limitations supported by medical evidence prevent
the applicant from participating in his previous line oi
work and he cannot reasonably hope to find any other
work, he is considered unemployable.
iv. If the available medical/psychological data is incomplete or conflicting, a regional department director's policy
decision may be used to establish employable/unemployable. This decision m u s t be documented based on available
medical/psychological data and case history.
v. If the illness or incapacity may last longer than a year,
then the person must apply for SSDI/SSI benefits.
5. Emergency Work Program Alternative:
When open to singles and couples, the EWP can be an
alternative to the GA Self-Sufficiency program for some
clients. The client m u s t be able to meet the EWP 40 hour a
week performance requirement. The 40 hours performance
requirement could be a combination of participation at the
work site, medical/mental health treatment and job search.
6. Self-Sufficiency:
a. All GA applicants and their spouses, at time of
application, and recipients at time of review, must be
interviewed by a GA self-sufficiency worker and complete a
self-sufficiency plan unless exempted. If a recipient at
review, h a s a self- sufficiency plan, an interview by the
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

T. TRON BURGUNDY aka Ronald
G. Smith

)
)
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
v.

)

STATE OF UTAH, Department
of Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services

)

Case No. 970903742AA
Judae Parley R. Baldwin

Respondent.

The foregoing matter came before the court for trial on
December 18, 1997 on Petitioner's complaint for de novo review of
the Findings and Order issued by the Department of Human
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings en May 8, 1997.
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided.

The

The petitioner, T. Tron

Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson.

The Respondent

State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant
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Attorney General.

At the hearing, the Court accepted the

Stipulation of Material Facts executed and filed by the parties.
Petitioner submitted an Affidavit with his Reply to Trial Brief
filed with the permission of the court after the trial.
The Court having reviewed the file, heard the arguments of
the parties and having fully considered the record in this matter
enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Pursuant to the stipulation of material facts submitted by
the parties, the court finas that:
1.

Petitioner T. Tron Burgundy began receiving General

Welfare Assistance

GA) from tne State of Utah in May, 1994,

cased upon a determination m a t ne was unempioyaole.
2.

On June, ", 1994, while receiving GA benefits,

Petitioner applied for disability benefits under the federal
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) programs.
3.

On July 21, 1994, Petitioner received notice from the

Ogden Office of Family Support that he was no longer considered
unemployable and that his GA would terminate on July 31, 1994.

2
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4.

On or about August 1, 1994, Petitioner requested a Fair

Hearing on the decision to terminate his benefits and he
requested that his GA benefits continue while his hearing request
was pending.
5.

On August 16, 1994, Petitioner's case was heard before

Fair Hearing Officer Neal Bernson.

At this hearing, Petitioner

had the opportunity to suomit evidence, question and call
witnesses, present argument, ana be represented by counsel.
6.

On October 6, 1994, the Fair Hearing Officer issued a

decision sustaining the closure of Petitioner's GA case.
7.

Petitioner requested a review of the Fair Hearing

Officer's decision.
8.

On or about January c, 1995, the Director of the

Office of Administrative Hearing closed the record of review on
the Fair Hearing decision after receiving memoranda from all
parties .
9.

On April 1, 1995, the Office of Recovery Services

served a Notice of Agency Action: Overpayment Determination
(NAA:OD) on Petitioner, alleging an overpayment in the amount of
$726.00 for GA benefits paid while his Fair Hearing decision was
pending.

oc
1
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10.

Petitioner timely requested a review of this agency

action on April 6, 1995.

However, that hearing was stayed until

the final agency action on the eligibility appeal was rendered.
11.

On July 20, 1995, Petitioner was found by the Social

Security Administration to be disabled under the SSDI and SSI
programs, with the disability commencing in September, 1993.
12.

On November 12, 1996, the Director of the Office of

Administrative Hearings affirmed the Fair Hearing Officer's
eligibility decision finding petitioner not eligible for GA
benefits.
13.

Petitioner did not appeal .this eligibility decision.
On March 10, 1997, a hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge on the overpayment alleged in the
NAA:OD.
14.

On May 8, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued

her final agency decision on the overpayment determination.
As allowed by the court the following facts were submitted
to the court in Petitioner's Affidavit attached to his Response
to Defendant's Trial Brief:
15.

In July 1994, Petitioner was 56 years of age and was

suffering from physical and mental impairments.
16.

When he received a notice of termination of GA

4

benefits, petitioner was homeless, unable to work and had no
savings, assets or other means of support himself.
17.

At the time Petitioner requested a hearing on the

termination of his GA assistance, he believed he was entitled to
GA because he was disabled.
18.

Several months after being terminated from GA benefits,

petitioner reapplied for those benefits and was found eligible to
receive them.
19.

He continued to receive them until he became eligible

for Social Security Disability benefits.
Pursuant to the evidence presented at trial, the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that:
20.

Petitioner was notified of the decision to terminate

his GA benefits.
21.

Petitioner requested a Fair Hearing on the decision

terminating his benefits.
22.

Petitioner elected to continue receiving GA until

after a decision was issued on the Fair Hearing.
23.

Petitioner was aware that if the decision from the

Fair Hearing was against him, he would subsequently be
responsible for the overpayment.

5
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Based on the above findings of fact, the Court now makes its
conclusions of law:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The law requires the petitioner to repay the GA

benefits he received during the Fair Hearing hearing process if
he is unsuccessful ar his hearing.

See 45 C.F.R.

§205.10(a)(4)(I)(B), Utah Code Ann. §62A-9-129 and Rule 8444(2)(A), Volume II of the Department of Human Services, Office of
Family Support (UTAH-D.H.S.-O.F.S., Vol. II).
2.

This law is not unconstitutional.

3.

Requiring Petitioner to repay any GA he received

during a period of ineligibility has no chilling effect on his
right to access
4.

to tne court.

The State has erected no barrier which caused

Petitioner to lose his right to access the court.
5.

The right to access does not guarantee Petitioner that

he will prevail.
6.

Petitioner has the right to access

the courts whether

or not he continues to receive GA during the hearing process.
7.

Petitioner's right to due process was not inhibited

6
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because he was able to exercise all of his procedural rights by
contesting the termination of his benefits.
8.

If Petitioner unsuccessfully contests his termination

of benefits and he elected to continue receiving GA during the
hearing process, then he is required to repay any general
assistance he received while ineligible from August, 1994 to
October, 1994.
9.

The final agency decision should be affirmed.

10.

Petitioner should pay to the State $726.00 for

general assistance he received during, his period of ineligibility

DATED this

f>

day of

^5(A[^

1998.

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, first-class postage
prepaid, this

LJ

day of

y<

, 1998, to:
MICHAEL E. 3ULS0N, ESQ.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES
550 24TH STREET, SUITE 300
OGDEN, UT 84401

Barbara L. Huber
Paralegal
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Stephanie M^^Sagerstein (#5541!
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (#1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
515 East 100 South, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 140835
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0835
Telephone: (801) 53 6-8 358
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
:RON BURGUNDY aka Ronald
G. Smith
JUDGMENT AND
ORDER

Petitioner,
v,
STATE OF UTAH, Department
of Human Services, Office of
Recovery. Services

Case Mo. 970903742AA
Judge Parley R. Ealdwin

Respondent.

The foregoing matter came before the court for trial en
December 18, 199~ en Petitioner's complaint for ce novo review of
the Findings and Order issued cy

the Department cf Human

Services, Office of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1997.
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided.

The

The petitioner, T. Tron

Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson.

The Respondent

State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant
Attorney General.
The Court having reviewed the file, heard arguments made by
the parties, and having fully considered the record in this
matter, and having entered its Findinas cf Fact and Conclusions

of Law,
HEREBY ORDERS THAT:
The final agency decision issued en May 8, 1997 is affirmed.
Petitioner's right to access

the courts was not violated.

A

judgment is entered in favor of the the State of Utah, Office of
Recovery Services and against Petitioner for $726.00 for an
overpayment of general assistance during the time period he was
ineligible to receive that assistance from August 1994 to
October, 1994.

Said judgment shall accrue at the judgment rate

of interest.
i

DATED this >>

dav cf '3 H-U

, 1998.

(

PARLEY R. BALDWIN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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GENERAL PROVISIONS
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qj?nt Right?
Persons who are eligible for financial assistance have the right to receive
correct and timely benefits. They have the right to receive proper notice if
there is a change in the amount of benefits for which they qualify. In most
situations this means notice must be written, adequate and timely. The
intent behind notice rules is discussed in this section. (See also Sections
810, 810-1 for more rules about notice.)
In addition, all people have the right to:
1.

2.

ADDIV

for Assistance

A.

Clients may apply or reapply any time for assistance through
any of our programs.

B.

Any client who needs help from district staff in order to apply,
has a right to receive that help.

Be Treated with Courtesy
Clients have the right to be treated with dignity, courtesy and respect.
This includes, but is not limited to, the following:
A.

Being addressed as Mr., Mrs., Ms., or Miss.

B.

Being told the name of any worker they contact.

C.

Being told clearly and courteously (verbally and in writing)
which verifications and information he must provide.

(Continued on Next Page)
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Fair Hearings
The client has a legal right to ask for a fair hearing any time he does not
agree with an action on his case.
Explain the policy and the action when a client questions it. Let him talk to
your supervisor if he wants. But, if he still wants to ask for a hearing, don't
try and stop him. Help him fill out a Form 490. He can turn it in to the
Local Office or the Office of Administrative Hearings. (After a hearing has
been scheduled, see Section 180-2 and use an agency conference and
attempt to resolve the issue before the hearing.)
There are two types of hearings. These are:
1.

In-person Hearings. All parties meet at the same place for the
hearing.

2.

Telephonic Hearings. The hearing examiner remains in his office and
conducts the hearing via telephone conference call to one location.
All other parties who attend the hearing meet in one place for this
type of hearing.

The client may choose the type of hearing he wants. The Hearings Office
will choose the type of hearing for any client who does not indicate which
type of hearing he would prefer.
1.

The client has to ask for the hearing in writing within 90 days of the
effective date of the case action with which he disagrees.

2.

The Hearing Examiner will tell the client and the Local Office: the
time, date, place, and reason for the hearing. Generally he has to mail
this notice at least ten days before the hearing. But if all parties want
it sooner, he can hold it sooner.

3.

The client can ask for postponements of the scheduled hearing.
These postponements cannot exceed a total of 30 days.
(Continued on Next Page)
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Postponements of the scheduled hearing will not be granted beyond the
30 days for any reason.
4.

If the Local Office wants legal counsel, contact the financial policy
specialist at the State Office of Family Support. The Specialist will
coordinate legal representation with the Attorney General's office.

5.

Fair Hearings are not open to the public. The only ones that can attend
are the Hearing Examiner, representatives and witnesses for the
Departments of Human Services and Health, and representatives
witnesses, friends, and relatives of the client. The Hearing Examiner can
limit the number of people at a hearing if there isn't room for everyone.

6.

When a hearing is about a medical issue, the client can get a new
medical report if he and the Hearing Examiner decide it is necessary.
The client can choose the medical person he wants to do the new report.
The Local Office must pay for it if the Hearing Examiner says so.
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When To Continue Assistance For a Recipient
190-2 When To Continue Assistance For A Recipient
1.

When the action in question required advance notice, continue the
financial assistance if the client asked for the hearing anytime before
the effective date of the action or within 10 days of the notice mail
date.
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner will decide what the issues are.
If he says the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or
State policy or law, stop the financial assistance at that time.
Otherwise, continue the financial assistance until you receive the
hearing decision.

2.

When the action in question did not require advance notice, the OFS
Associate Director decides about continued assistance. If he says
the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or State policy
or law, do not issue continued assistance. However, if he says that
is not the only reason for the hearing, continue the financial
assistance if the client asked for the hearing within 10 days of the
notice mail date. You would then continue the financial assistance
until you get the hearing decision.

3.

If you continue the financial assistance when the hearing is because
the client does not agree with the amount of an overpayment,
continue the grant minus the recovery amount. However, if you
continue the financial assistance when the hearing is about whether
or not an overpayment exists in the first place, reinstate the original
grant amount.

4.

The client is not entitled to continued assistance pending any appeal
of the initial hearing decision.

(Continued on Next Page)
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A.

When to Stop Continued Assistance for a Recipient
1.

If the client requests the assistance be stopped. The
request must be made in writing.

2.

If the Hearing Examiner states, in writing, the only
reason for the hearing is because of Federal or State
policy or law, stop the financial assistance at that time.
Otherwise, continue the financial assistance until you
receive the hearing decision.
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Incorrect Payments
An incorrect payment occurs when a person either:
1.

Receives a payment he is not eligible for, or

2.

Receives a payment he is eligible for but in the wrong amount.

840-1

Causes of Incorrect Payments
All overpayments must be referred to ORS no matter what the
cause. However, ORS may treat the collection of an overpayment
differently depending on its cause. For example, ORS can collect
interest on an overpayment caused by intentional violation, but
not on one caused by administrative error.
1.

Administrative Error
Administrative errors are all mistakes made by state or local
office staff in computing payments or eligibility. They
include the local office or state staff:

2.

A.

Delaying action on a reported change.

B.

Making a math error.

C.

Completing forms incorrectly.

D.

Applying policy incorrectly.

Inadvertent Error
Inadvertent errors are mistakes made by the client or his
representative that are not intended. They include errors
that result from:

(Continued on next page)
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3.

A.

Not understanding instructions and forgetfulness;

B.

A change that is reported more than 10 days after
the change occurs by a client who had not received
an explanation of the reporting requirements.

Intentional Violation

Intentional violations are deliberate breaches of program
rules by the client or his representative. They include:
A.

Making false or misleading statements;

B.

Misrepresenting, concealing, or withholding facts;

C.

Posing as someone else;

D.

Not reporting the receipt of a financial assistance
payment that the individual know her was not
entitled to;

E.

Not reporting a change within 10 days after the
change occurs, and the client knew they were
supposed to report the change.
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190-8

What To Do When a Hearing Decision Is Received
1.

You must comply within ten days. A hearing decision is
binding on both the state and regional offices.

2.

The Regional Director must review the case within thirty
days to make sure the action has been taken.

3.

The State OFS will look at corrective action if a decision
indicates a statewide problem.

What To Do If the Decision or Appeal Causes An Overpayment
When the hearing sustains the agency put the overpayment
information on a 79. Send the 79 to the Office of Recovery
Services. ORS will recover the assistance overpaid pending a
hearing.

190-9

How To Appeal A Decision
1.

The regional office can appeal a hearing decision only by
filing a petition in District Court within 30 days of a
hearing decision.

2.

The client can appeal a hearing decision to the Director of
the Office of Administrative Hearings or to the District
Court within 30 days of a hearing decision.

190-9

